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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party, held in December, 1978, was epoch-making in the legal history of the 
People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). The goal of this article is to clarify the character of 
adjudication since that meeting. At that meeting, strengthening "Democracy and the 
Legal System" was declared to be a major goal of the Party. In order to understand 
P.R.C. adjudication fully, it is necessary to consider the role of the judiciary and the 
impact of the Party upon that role. Thus, this article focuses on the question of who is 
the judicial decision-maker in the P.R.C.? In addition, the article will touch briefly upon 
the related question of the fundamental nature of P.R.C. judicial decision-making. 
Namely, is P.R.C. judicial decision-making truly judicial, or merely administrative? 
In bourgeois society, judicial independence is regarded as the most important com-
ponent of impartial justice. The judge, or often the jury in Anglo-American systems, 
decides the case under consideration. It is a fundamental aspect of the legal system that 
a judge answers to no one, and the only constraint he acknowledges is that he must 
remain faithful to the existing body of legal doctrine and legislative enactments. 
Judicial independence is said to be of vital importance in contemporary society 
where executive-administrative power has become predominant. Liberal society presup-
poses the separation of powers. Whether such a system works or not depends upon the 
independence of the judiciary, because under an administrative state, legislative power 
has been usurped by executive power. Without judicial independence, the state would 
tighten its control incessantly and eventually dominate almost all aspects of social life. 
The P.R.C. does not take such a skeptical attitude toward state power. In China 
there can be no separation of state power because the state embodies the will of the 
proletariat. According to official political theory, the National People's Congress repre-
sents this will, and is thus the highest organ of state power. The judiciary is by definition 
subordinate to this highest organ of state power. In this sense, the judiciary in Communist 
* Professor of Law, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. 
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China is not independent. However, this does not necessarily mean that judicial inde-
pendence is entirely nonexistent. The 1954 Constitution provided "People's courts shall 
conduct adjudication independently and shall be subject only to the law." The 1982 
Constitution also provided that "People's courts shall exercise their authority indepen-
dently according to the law and shall not be interfered with by any administrative organ, 
organization, or individual." Thus, at least as far as formal legal provisions are concerned, 
there is little difference between Western and Chinese Society. 
However, as mentioned above, the People's courts must accept the supervision of 
the People's congresses. This constitutes a major distinction between the Chinese brand 
of judicial independence and the Western one. However, the People's congresses have 
held no real power. As in other communist countries, it is the Communist Party that is 
the real source of power in China. What must be addressed, therefore, is the relationship 
between the Party and the court. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE COURT 
A. The Practice Prior to the 1978 Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
I t was not until the 1954 Constitution that judicial independence appeared in 
codified form in Communist China. Even after the Communists assumed national power, 
as well as during the Chinese Soviet Republic (1931-1934) and Yenan (1935-1945) eras, 
the courts were integrated into the governmental structure. This is shown in the Organic 
Law of the Chinese People's Government (1949) and the Provisional Organic Regulations 
of People's Courts (1951). Article 78 of the 1954 Constitution prohibited for the first 
time interference in cases by any administrative organ, organization, or individual. 
However, neither the Constitution nor commentaries on it mentioned the applicability 
of Article 78 to Party interference. According to one commentator, this silence reflected 
the tension between the Party and the judiciary.' Could the Party intervene directly in 
individual cases? And if so, for what reason? The Anti-Rightist Movement answered this 
question explicitly in favor of the Party when it declared that Party leadership was 
absolute, extending even to the adjudication of individual cases. The official position is 
illustrated in the article Refute Jia Qian's Anti-Party Nonsense about 'Independent Adjudication', 
wherein the author notes: 
The working class carries out its leadership of the state through its 
vanguard, the Party. Since the court is a state organ, the Party as a matter 
of course leads the court. As shown by the facts, only the Party's intervention 
in adjudication has made it possible to correct illegalities and to apply the 
law correctly. Party leadership is carried out through the Party organization 
within the court. All important judicial matters should be decided by the 
Party organization, including not only problems of political ideology or pol-
icy, but also concrete cases. By correctly handling individual cases, the Party 
can demonstrate how to carry out its policies and guidelines effectively. If 
I Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and 'judicial Independence': 1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
984 (1969). 
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the Party limits itself to passing on policies and guidelines, its leadership will 
become abstract and useless. 2 
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Even after the Anti-Rightist Movement, however, there remained, at least formally, 
a functional separation between the Party and the judiciary. However, the Cultural 
Revolution led to the total disintegration of the system of law enforcement, as the slogan 
"smash gong-jianja [police-procuracy-court]" plainly illustrates. From the beginning of 
the Cultural Revolution to the promulgation of the Code of Organizations of the People's 
Court in 1979, there had been no reason to inquire into the problem of a politically 
separate judiciary, since neither the 1975 nor the 1978 Constitution provided for 'Judicial 
independence. " 
B. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
Despite its absolute leadership during this period, the Party did not intervene 
uniformly in all judicial matters, but rather limited its intervention to cases with far-
reaching implications and to criminal cases involving a sentence of three or more years 
of imprisonment. This intervention in judicial decision-making was accomplished 
through a system of examination and approval by a Party committee. This system was 
not abolished by the Eleventh Central Committee at the end of 1978, even though it 
emphasized the strengthening of democracy and the legal system. 
The communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
proclaimed the independence of the judicial and the procuratorial organs, as well as the 
consolidation of the socialist legal system. However, the communique did not mention 
the role of the Party at all. This is due to the fact that the Party's intervention through 
the examination and approval system was still regarded as vital. This is illustrated by 
many contemporaneous statements: 
The People's courts as an instrument of the proletarian dictatorship 
must ... positively and voluntarily ask for instructions from the Party com-
mittee, or report their works to that committee, and strictly implement the 
system of examination and approval of cases by the Party committee. 3 
When the People's court decides to arrest a suspect in the course of its 
investigation, it must get the Party committee's approval in accordance with 
internal Party regulations concerning the authority of approval of arrest. 4 
[The People's court] must regularly report on the situation of criminal 
justice to the Party committee and listen to instructions from the committee. 
[The courts] must strictly carry out the system of having cases examined and 
approved by the Party committee. In submitting cases to the Party committee, 
2 Feng Ruoquan, Refute Jia Qian's Anti-Party Nonsense About 'Independent Adjudication', (1958) 
ZHENGFA Y ANJIU 20. See also Shuhua, Reactionary Essence of 'Independent Adjudication,' (1958) 2 
ZHENGFA Y ANJIU 49. 
3 Jiang Hua, Report in the Eight National People's Judicial Working Conference April 25, 1978, in 
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINSHI SUSONGFAXUEXI CANKAO ZILIAO (THE REFERENCE MATE-
RIALS FOR STUDYING THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA) 
[hereinafter REFERENCE MATERIALS), vol. 1, at 295 (Zhongguo Renmin Daxue FalU Xi, Law De-
partment of Chinese People's University, 1981) (on file with the author). 
4 Summary of the Eighth National People's Judicial Working Conference, May 26, 1978, REFERENCE 
MATERIALS, supra note 3, vol. 1, at 284-85. 
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the courts must accurately report the facts of the cases, the grounds of 
sentencing, and their opinions on the handling of the cases.5 
Some cases in the courts must be submitted to the Party committee for 
examination and approval. At present, cases involving the death penalty are 
to be submitted to the provincial Party committee. Ten categories among 
those, (the contents are unknown), and criminal cases committed by foreign-
ers are to be reported directly to the Supreme People's Court, which must 
submit them to the Central Committee of the Party for approval. If in the 
next National People's Congress the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure are adopted, the Supreme Court will officially hear or ratify death 
penalty cases, but the actual power of sentencing a criminal to death is still 
in the hands of the Party Central Committee .... If conflict occurs between 
the Party and the courts with regard to the problem of how to deal with the 
cases, ... the courts must ask for the approval of the Party committee as 
much as possible. When conflicts are not resolved, the courts must report to 
the Party committee correctly, consult with it unhurriedly, explain the facts 
and the reasons clearly, respect its leadership, and adhere to its principles.6 
As to the Party's leadership over the court, the courts should put into 
practice the principle of Mao Zedong that all powers are monopolized by the 
Party, and minor issues are delegated to other organizations. As far as 
important matters such as the Party's line, guidance, and policy are con-
cerned, the Party must strengthen its leadership over the courts. The People's 
courts must voluntarily ask for instructions from the Party.7 
Once the Code of Criminal Procedure is promulgated, [the Party] must 
strengthen its leadership over the courts .... But it would be mistaken to 
interpret Party leadership as the substitution of the Party for the courts, and 
the examination and approval of individual cases by the Party .... But if 
important and specific cases such as crimes committed by foreigners are 
brought before the courts, the courts must submit them to the Party com-
mittee for discussion.s 
Must the Party committee examine and approve judicial cases? As to 
ordinary cases, it need not .... But as to important, complicated cases or 
those in which the discipline of the Party or the government is combined 
with criminal responsibility, it would be impossible for the police, the pro-
curacy, and the court to grasp the facts and the truth very clearly without 
the direct leadership and inquiry of the Party committees at local levels and 
the Party Central Committee.9 
How does the Party exercise the leadership? First of all, the Party com-
mittee should not examine concrete cases .... [But this] does not necessarily 
5 Zeng Hanzhou, Report in the National CriminalJustice Working Conference, REFERENCE MATERIALS, 
supra note 3, vol. 1, at 326. 
6 Comrade Jiang Hua's Address to Some Comrades of Responsible Positions in the Higher, the Intermediate 
People'S Courts and the Military Courts at the End of the Informal Discussion, April 10, 1979, REFERENCE 
MATERIALS, supra note 3, vol. 1, at 197-98. 
7 Xu Wulin, Judicial Independence and the Party's Leadership, Guangming Ribao, April 21, 1979, 
at 3. 
8 SUN YINGJIE & FENG CAIJIN, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINSHI SUSONGFAJIANGHUA, [A 
GUIDE TO THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], 4 (1980). 
9 Comrade Peng Zheng's Speeches at the Forum of National Procuratorial Working, the Meeting of the 
Presidents of National Higher People'S Courts and Military Courts, and the Meeting of the Third National 
Pretrial Work,July 27,1978, REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 3, vol. 1, at 101. 
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mean that the Party does not intervene at all. In some special cases, the Party 
committee cannot help intervening. Those cases include: cases related to the 
Party and the Army such as those of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four"; cases 
of far-reaching implications; cases involving foreigners; and cases relating to 
the United Front. Thus the Party committee can take the initiative and 
concentrate its energy on dealing with major cases. You, the Party commit-
tees, will be able to monopolize all power for yourselves. If you try to deal 
with every kind of case, you would be too concerned with trivial cases to deal 
adequately with important matters. IO 
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From these statements, we can see that many types of cases came under the exam-
ination and approval system. They include death penalty cases; crimes committed by 
foreigners; cases relating to the Party's line, guidance or policy; cases of far-reaching 
implications; and cases relating to the United Front. The scope of the examination and 
approval system extends from the arrest decision to the death penalty. This is chiefly 
because the system's criteria have not been codified. We can also see that the Party 
possibly had its -own internal regulations on arrest. Furthermore, President Jiang Hua 
of the Supreme People's Court surprisingly acknowledged the Party's primary jurisdic-
tion over the death penalty, even after the implementation of the Code of the Criminal 
Procedure. 
C. An Instruction of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 
September 9, 1979 
There is little doubt that the examination and approval system, although originally 
regarded as temporary, has existed continuously since the Communists' assumption of 
nationwide power in 1949. Thirty years later, for the first time, this system was officially 
abolished by An Instruction of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning 
the Full Implementation of the Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal Procedure. I I This instruc-
tion was aimed at guaranteeing the full implementation of the Law of Criminal Proce-
dure. It consists of five items. First, the courts must properly handle cases in accordance 
with the criminal law and the law of the criminal procedure and fully correct all thoughts 
and customs that contradict those laws. Second, the Party must intensify its leadership 
over the judiciary and make sure that the judicial function is exercised in accordance 
with the Constitution and laws. Third, the Party must quickly reestablish the judicial 
organs at all levels and make an effort to reconstruct a contingent of judicial workers. 
Fourth, the Party must broadly and profoundly propagate the laws and prepare for the 
full implementation of the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure. Fifth, the 
Party organization at all levels, including the Party's leading cadres and all Party mem-
bers, must exercise leadership in observing the laws. 
The contents of the second item, which relates to the matter of 'judicial indepen-
dence," are as follows: 
... The Party committees and the judicial organs must each carry out 
their own special functions. One must neither replace nor become confused 
10 Some Problems on the Socialist Legal System, September 1,1979, REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 
3, vol. I, at 112-13. 
II See, REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 3, vol. I, at 49-56. This report is reproduced in full 
as an appendix to this article. 
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with the other. For this reason, the Central Committee of the Party decides 
to abolish the system of examination and approval by the Party committees 
at all levels . . .. [E]xcept for the very few cases committed by cadres of 
county-level ... and well-known personages, which would then require in-
structions from higher [courts] because of specific and important consider-
ations .... The Party leadership over the judiciary is limited to that of 
guidance and policy. The Party committee at all levels must firmly correct 
habits and manners, including those of judicial administrations, in which the 
Party substitutes for the government or law is replaced by words, or cases 
are handled without regard to the law. 12 
However, this epoch-making instruction aimed at judicial autonomy was of no effect. 
There is evidence that Party officials still continued to interfere in adjudication. For 
example, one commentator noted: 
In spite of the proclamation of the abolishment of the system of having 
cases examined and approved by the Party committee, there still remains the 
idea that "the Party is superior to the law." Therefore, it is very difficult to 
abolish this system completely. In some localities, a few cases are dealt with 
by means of this system. Cases of far-reaching implications are handled not 
by the courts, but by the members of Party committees. Moreover, there are 
even cases in which comrades of Party committees or units refuse to execute 
the legally effective judgements passed by the courts, or attempt to change 
those judgements. 13 
At the same time, it should also be noted that there are some judicial officials who 
are reluctant to carry out their duties independently. Commentators have noted: 
Some political-judicial cadres hesitate to decide cases themselves as soon 
as they receive a different opinion from the units concerned, or from higher 
level Party committees or individual leaders. There are also those who are 
unwilling to carry out their functions given by law and ask for examination 
and approval by the Party in order to avoid the suspicion that "they do not 
obey the Party leadership."14 
When the opinions of the police and the court are divided, the Uudicial 
officers] ask for examination and approval by political-legal subcommittees 
[within the Party committee] before deciding cases. 15 
These examples indicate a lack of judicial autonomy. Why are judicial officers apt 
to rely upon the Party in handling cases? Chiefly because they do not like to come into 
conflict with the Party. Furthermore, the judicial officers' level of knowledge and legal 
acumen is not sophisticated enough to perform the judicial function independently. 
China has been enacting many laws with considerable speed. However, it would be 
foolish to attempt to strengthen the legal system without enough legal experts skilled in 
handling the law. The situation is not much better than it was in the pre-cultural 
12 [d. at 52. 
13 Guo Buyue, Handling Cases Strictly According to the Law, [1958]1 FAXUE ZAZHI 8. See also Leng 
Shaochuan, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Some Preliminary Observations, THE CHINA QUARTERLY, 
September 1981, at 458. 
14 Guo Buyue, supra note 13, at 8-9. 
15 Political-Legal Group Can Neither Examine Nor Approve Cases Any Longer, Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, 
March 13, 1981, at 3. 
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revolution period. At that time, it was said that there were judicial officers who did not 
understand technical legal matters. 16 
Modern commentators have noted similar problems with today's legal system. For 
example, one commentator noted that there are many judicial officers who cannot 
conduct trials according to legal procedure, and that there are even those who have 
court verdicts written by primary school teachers. 17 Another commentator notes that few 
judicial officers are able to administer justice independently and draft court verdicts by 
themselves. IS Moreover, there are even the following reports on illegal activities by 
judicial officers: 
Some judicial officers in Yulin county of Shanxi province unjustly hand-
cuffed the plaintiff's attorney and forced him to sign his assent in courtY' 
The president of the Guannan County Court of Jiangsu province mis-
takenly sentenced an innocent person to five years imprisonment. The in-
termediate court reversed this sentence and declared the defendant not 
guilty. But the president of the county court disregarded this final decision 
and did not release the defendant. 20 
As long as such conditions persist, it will be extremely difficult to realize judicial 
autonomy in China. It is very understandable that the Party Central Committee empha-
sized the retraining of judicial workers. However, it seems that the education of legal 
experts is not making much progress. 
In 1985 there were 3000 or more People's courts throughout the country, yet sixty 
percent lacked the necessary facilities. 21 In 1979, very few among the 58,000 judicial 
officers throughout the country had what may be considered specialized legal knowledge. 
In 1983, only three or four percent of the police, the procuracy, and the court were 
graduates of institutes of political science and law or university law departments. 22 Even 
in Beijing, as of 1982, those who had been trained for the legal profession in institutes 
and universities constituted only ten percent of the workers. Those who had received 
shortened training constituted twenty percent, and the rest had received no legal edu-
cation at al1. 23 It is thus important to train legal experts as quickly as possible. However, 
little progress seems to have been made, as illustrated by a 1982 report which found 
that law department students constituted only six or seven percent of all college students 
nationwide. 24 
16 Fa Yanshi, Let's Make Efforts to Improve the Quality of judicial Documents, REFERENCE MATERIALS, 
supra note 3, vol. 2, at 271. 
17 Jiang Hua, Let's Correct the Ideological Line and Greet New Long March, [1979] 2 MINZHU Yu 
FAZHI3. 
18 Comrade Chen Pixian Had Talks With People of Legal Circles in Shanghai, and Had a Lively Discussion 
Concerning the Matter of Improvement of Legislative, judicial and Political-Legal Works, [1983] 3 MINZHU 
Yu FAZHI 5. 
19 Yulin County Court Detained Illegally an Attorney, Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, October 29, 1984, at 2. 
20 How Can the Person Like This Serve as a President of People'S Court? Lhongguo Fazhi Bao, July 
I, 1985, at 4. 
21 Basic Working Conditions of Courts Should Be Improved Urgently, Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, April 3, 
1985, at I. 
22 See, Guangming Ribao, July 25, 1983, at 3. 
23 Li Yuan, Let's Make Effort to Usher a New Epoch in judicial-Administrative Work, [1982] 6 FAXUE 
ZAZHI 3. 
24 Zhu Qiwu, It Is An Urgent Task To Educate Legal Personnel, [1982] 6 FAXUE ZAZHI II. 
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Why are there so few candidates for the legal profession? One reason is that the 
social standing of judicial officers and lawyers remains very low. Undoubtedly, in a 
bureaucratic society like China, a chief concern of social members is social ranking. This 
ranking system is politically, economically, and socially of vital importance in a bureau-
cratic society. In China, this ranking is divided into 24 grades, and those lower than the 
17th grade are regarded as the ordinary class, 17th-14th as the middle class, 13th-8th 
as the upper class, and 7th or higher the senior upper class.25 Among these rankings, 
the ranking of a judicial officer is not high, a situation unlike bourgeois society. Even 
the ranking of a judicial officer in a higher court is lower than the 17th grade, a ranking 
which is very low.26 
In spite of the instruction from the Central Committee of the Party to enforce 
judicial independence, the People's courts do not have enough power or prestige to solve 
legal conflicts. This is due mainly to their low level of professional ability, and their 
related low ranking in the bureaucratic hierarchy. As long as the conditions of courts in 
China remain unimproved, the authority of the Party will incessantly intrude in the field 
of adjudication. 
Since 1981, opinions defending the system of examination and approval by the Party 
have once again appeared. One article in the People's Daily as early as 1980 asserted that 
the intervention of the Party committee was indispensable for handling important and 
complicated cases, or cases with far-reaching implications.27 By the end of 1981, even 
President Jiang Hua of the Supreme People's Court, who was said to have had personally 
opposed it, acknowledged the importance of Party intervention. In the Third National 
Working Conference of Criminal Justice, he delivered a speech advocating that the 
People's courts voluntarily seek instructions from the Party committee, or submit reports 
on their work to the Party committee when the cases brought before the court are 
difficult ones.28 As one commentator noted: 
Does the Party committee have the authority to handle individual cases? 
Of course it has. In practice, the Party committee must intervene whenever 
that committee finds the case to be important and difficult or have socially 
far-reaching implications .... When serious conflicts arise as to factfmding 
or the application of the law among the police, the procuracy, and the court, 
[the court] must strive for an agreement among those by asking for instruc-
tions from the Party.29 
This statement is strange from the point of view of the adversary system of bourgeois 
society. Why should three organizations; the police, the procuracy and the court, be 
consistent as to factfinding or applications of law? Moreover, why must the courts ask 
the Party for instructions when serious conflict arises among these three organizations? 
There is no doubt that the Party, and not the court, was, and is, the real decision-maker 
in P.R.C. adjudication. The Party is clearly the center of judicial power. 
25 Y. FUNABASHI, NAIBU - A CHINA REPORT, 104-05, (l983). 
26 Wan Chengzhi, People's Courts, Too, Must Implement the Policy For Intellectuals, Zhongguo Fazhi 
Bao, August 10, 1984, at 3. 
27 Ma Rongjie, Is Government Officer Stronger or is Law Stronger?, Renmin Ribao, July 29, 1980, 
at 5. 
28 Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, November 27, 1981, at 1. 
29 Tao Mao, Comments on the Principle of Judicial Independence, [1982] 4 BEIJIN ZHENGFAXUEYUAN 
XUEBAO 51. 
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE EXAMINATION AND ApPROVAL BY THE 
PRESIDENT WITHIN THE PEOPLE'S COURT 
A. Arguments Against Examination and Approval 
203 
Soon after the Central Committee of the Party issued the instruction for the abol-
ishment of the examination and approval system by the Party, another examination and 
approval system, this time by the president or the chief judicial officer, was also criticized. 
Liu Chunmao initiated this movement and he noted at the time: 
To be sure, this system played an important role in the early periods of 
the P.R.C., when the legal system was not well-organized. But even in those 
periods, there were abuses. Now that the legal system has become well-
organized, the examination and approval system is irrational, illegal, and a 
barrier to the construction of the legal system. Accordingly, it should be 
abolished for the following reasons: 
First, according to the legal provisions, the president or the chief judicial 
officer has the authority only to appoint judicial officers to the bench, to 
bring the decision which has already taken legal effect up to the judicial 
committee for reconsideration when he feels the decision is wrong as to 
factfinding or application of law, and to decide whether the judicial officer 
in charge of the case should be withdrawn. No law gives him the authority 
to override the function of the bench. This system therefore conflicts with 
the legally stipulated judiciary system. 
Second, this system is a barrier to the implementation of the jury system 
which, strictly speaking, is more similar to the schoffengericht system in Ger-
many than the Anglo-American system. For the president or the chief judicial 
officer to overturn the jurors' judgment would change the role of jurors. 
Third, this system is contrary to the principle of democratic centralism, 
since it will enable the president or the chief judicial officer personally to 
overturn decisions made by the bench. 
Fourth, this system impedes judicial independence. It is reported that 
in a certain county a deputy secretary of the Party committee ordered the 
president of the county court to rearrest a citizen who was found not guilty 
and released by the intermediate court. The president of the county court 
illegally petitioned the intermediate court for reconsideration of the decision. 
As illustrated by this example, it is likely that this system results in interfer-
ence from the outside. 
Fifth, this system will prevent judicial officers from developing political 
responsibility and professional skill. 
Finally, this system does not ensure the correction of incorrect decisions. 
The president participates in neither the trial nor the investigation, and 
cannot be familiar with the case in detail. Therefore, his decision, relying 
only on the oral report and the transcript, is likely to bring about mistakes.30 
The most critical assertion made by the commentators is that the system causes the 
abuse known as xianpan houshen [first decide and then try]. In other words, it makes the 
rights of a defendant meaningless in a public trial. With regard to this point, the 
30 Inquiry Into the System of Examination and Approval of Cases by the President or the Chief Judicial 
Officer, [1982] 2 FAXUE ZAZHI 34-36. 
204 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:195 
comments by He Lunqi, a member of a higher People's court in Hubei province, are 
helpful: 
A criminal case is in fact predetermined through the system of exami-
nation and approval by the president or the chief judicial officer prior to a 
public trial. As a result, the judgment at trial must follow the prior decision 
of the president or the chief judicial officer, however reasonable and per-
suasive the defendant's legal and factual defense may be.31 
As long as critics regard the trial and the decision by the bench as fundamental, it 
is only natural that they have criticized not only the intervention by the president or the 
chief judicial officer, but also that of the judicial committee. The basic functions of this 
committee are to sum up judicial experience and to discuss important or difficult cases 
or other problems concerning judicial work. However, in performing these functions, 
they asserted that the judicial committee should not determine guilt and sentence prior 
to a public tria}.32 Yet in fact, they say, the judicial committee discusses and decides every 
kind of case, regardless of importance, and then the trial in the court starts.33 As a result, 
the judicial officers can do nothing but try a case nominally in the court, with the role 
of counsel extremely diminished.34 
Of course a lilshi, or lawyer, in the P.R.C. is quite different from one in bourgeois 
society, where he is expected to defend the accused or his client with partisan zeal. In a 
totalitarian society like China the lawyer is expected to reconcile his activity with the 
interests of the state and the people.35 There is little that a lilshi in China can do for the 
protection of the defendant, especially in cases involving political offenses. Nevertheless, 
functional differences among the lawyer, the procurator, and the judicial officer are 
indispensable for accurate factfinding and fair adjudication. In this sense, this criticism 
of the examination and approval system by the president or the chief judicial officer is 
of importance, because the system nullifies the full implementation of the law of criminal 
procedure by rendering a public trial a mere formality. 
B. Counter-Criticism By Proponents of the System 
As mentioned above, the examination and approval system has been in use since 
the founding of the P.R.C. As early as the 1950s commentators have defended this 
system.36 This trend has continued through the 1980's. For example, Wen Shi, who was 
then the judicial officer of the higher court in Beijing city, responded to criticism of the 
system as follows: 
3I He Lunqui, Views and Opinions on the System of Examination and Approval of Cases by the President 
or the Chief Judicial Officer, [1981] 3 FAXUE ZAZHI 46. 
32 Li jieyun, The Principle of Judicial Independence and the Leadership of the Party Committee, [1980] 
3 BEIJIN ZHENGFAXUEYUAN XUEBAO 55. 
33 Li Shenyao, Preliminary Analysis on the Abuses of'Being Determined Prior to Trial', [1985]3 FAXUE 
29. 
34 Song Fanxiu, A Talk About a Decrease of Cases in Which Lawyers Appear in Criminal Court, [1984] 
10 FAXUE 41. 
35 Song Zhansheng, The Stand of Lawyer Chosen as an Advocate, [1982]4 FAXUE YANJIU 42. 
36 See e.g., Zhu Yun, Implement the Principle of Collective Leadership and Strengthen the Judicial Work 
Based on the Collegiate System, [1957] 3 ZHENGFA YANJIU 30. 
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Although Liu Chunmao attacks this system on the grounds that no law 
provides for it, non-existence of a legal provision does not necessarily equal 
illegality. If this was true, any criminal justice undertaken prior to the en-
actment of the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure would become 
invalid. This would be ridiculous. Next, the critics presuppose that the ex-
amination and approval system allows the president or the chief judicial 
officer to reject the decision made by the bench. This is not true .... The 
majority of opinions presented by the bench or independent judicial officer 
are approved by the president or the chief judicial officer. If conflict occurs 
between them and the bench, the president generally submits that case to 
the judicial committee for discussion. Neither the president nor the chief 
judicial officer can decide at his own discretion .... [Furthermore], with 
regard to the criticism that this system is detrimental to judicial independence 
because the judge is easily controlled by 'forces' which intervene in indepen-
dent adjudication, the social 'forces' here are in fact the leadership of the 
Party committee, although Liu talks about the 'will of the commanding 
officer' and the 'feudalistic privilege' .... The leadership of our party com-
mittee at every level aims to support and guarantee judicial independence. 
The Party committee rarely interferes wrongfully.37 
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In addition to Wen Shi's opinion, proponents eagerly defended the system on other 
grounds. First, owing to the Constitution and the Organizations of the People's Courts 
Code, the court is responsible to the National People's Congress and has the responsibility 
of reporting on its activities. The president represents the court and carries out this 
responsibility and, in order to do so, has the authority of examination and approval. 
According to article 107 of the law of criminal procedure, any important or difficult 
case shall be brought to a judicial committee for discussion and decision. No one but the 
president can determine whether the case is important or difficult or whether the case 
should be brought to the judicial committee or not. 38 Second, Article 14 of the Organi-
zations of the People's Courts Code provides that when the president of any level 
discovers that there is a definite mistake in any decision made by his court which has 
already taken legal effect, he has the authority to supervise and correct it. Thus, it is 
natural that his authority extends to any decision which has not yet taken legal effect. 39 
Third, the law allows the president to organize, take leadership of, and supervise judicial 
work. Therefore, before the bench starts the trial, the president can hear the report as 
to the details of the case and can express his own preliminary view on the scope of the 
determination of guilt and the resultant penalty.40 
These proponents all view the people's court as youji zhengti [organic whole]. Under 
this view, judicial independence means not that of the individual judicial officer, but that 
of the People's court as a whole. 41 While the court as an organic whole composed of the 
president, chief judicial officer, and the individual judicial officer, is independent of the 
outside, internally it is subject to the principle that the minority should be subordinate 
37 Wen Shi, The Examination and Approval of Cases by the President or the Chief Judicial Officer of 
People's Court is Never Illegal, [1981] 2 FAXUE ZAZHI 39. 
38 Id. at 40. 
39 Sun Changli, The Examination and Approval of Cases by the President or the Chief Judicial Officer 
of People'S Court is Completely Lawful, [1981] 3 FAXUE ZAZHI 45. 
40 Tao Mao, supra note 29, at 50. 
41 Wen Shi, supra note 37, at 40. 
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to the majority, the lower to the higher, the individual to the organization, and the 
locality to the center.42 Since the bench is only huanjie [one link] in the organic whole, 
its decision does not have any legal effect until it has received the approval of either the 
president or the chief judicial officer and/or the judicial committee, and been stamped 
with the official seal of the court.43 
President Jiang Hua of the Supreme Court is one of the proponents of this system 
and has delivered speeches concerning it in some People's courts. For example, in 
Wuqing county court, he stated that a collegiate bench within the court is not a standing 
organization. The court verdict made by the collegiate bench does not have legal effect 
until it has been publicly announced in the name of the People's court.44 In the Hexi 
District Court of Tienjin he also stated that: 
[A collegiate bench] is neither an organ nor a fixed organization. It has no 
authority to exercise judicial power as a representative of the People's court. 
A court verdict would not have any legal effect without the seal of the court 
.... A case which the president considers to be important or disputable is 
submitted to the judicial committee for discussion. After that the president 
affixes his signature and seal. A court verdict has no effect until the above 
steps are taken. This is the actual manner in which we have been dealing 
with the cases thus far.45 
His statements are undoubtedly based upon the idea of "an organic whole." Views such 
as these lead to the justification of the system of examination and approval by the 
president. The difficulty is, however, that the idea of the organic whole is likely to nullify 
the right of the defendant. It is unclear if proponents of the organic whole understand 
the serious problem that exists because the accused and the defense lawyer cannot 
participate in the examination by the president or in the discussion of the judicial 
committee. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In answering the question of who is the judicial decision-maker in China, I have 
examined adjudication in the P.R.C., especially in the post-1978 period. Both the 1954 
and 1982 Constitutions provided for judicial independence. Yet it would be incorrect to 
interpret this independence as meaning the elimination of the Party's intervention in 
the judicial decision-making process. Rather, the court was, and is, required to seek 
instructions from the Party in handling important or difficult cases. Officially, the court 
is the sole judicial decision-maker, however substantially decisive in judicial decision-
making the role of the Party may be. And yet, curiously, it is extremely difficult to 
identify the judicial decision-maker in a court which is composed of an individual judicial 
officer, the collegiate bench, the chief judicial officer, the president, and the judicial 
committee. More accurately, it would be impossible and perhaps foolish to try to identify 
42 Weh Shi, Is the Manner of the Examination and Approval of Cases by the President or the Chief 
Judicial Officer of People'S Court Illegal?, Zhongguo Fazhi Bao, April 24, 1981, at 1. 
43 Sung Changli, supra note 39, at 45. 
44 Comrade Jiang Hua's Speech on the Problem of Judicial Independence in the People's Court, [1981] 6 
MINZHU Yu FAZHI 4. 
45Id. at 4-5. 
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the decision-maker as long as adjudication in Communist China is based on the idea of 
"an organic whole." 
How should this manner of decision-making be characterized? With regard to this 
question, the opinion of Liu Chunmao that the prevalence of the examination and 
approval system results from the customary practice of administrative handling in the 
court is helpful. 46 In what sense is it administrative? He does not elaborate on that point. 
In this respect, the arguments set forth by W. Robson are useful. In his book Justice and 
Administrative Law, Robson identifies the differences between the judicial and the admin-
istrative decision-making process. He enumerates nine points concerning the judicial 
process. The first is the independence of the judge. The second is the immunity of the 
judge. The third is the integrity of the judge. The fourth is that a judge must act 
personally. The fifth is the lis inter partes [a suit between parties]. The sixth is the right 
to be heard. The seventh is to render a decision according to the evidence. The eighth 
is the case in hand. And the last is a final decision.47 As to the first and the fourth point 
among these, he explains as follows. 
At first, of all primitive ideas of justice, none is more fundamental than 
an impartial judge. The first condition of the impartiality is independence. 
The meaning of a judge's independence is that no one can give him orders 
as to the manner in which he is to perform his work. In this respect, the 
administrator is quite different. He is an employed person in the sense that 
employment involves a subordination to higher authority, a responsibility to 
receive instructions as to the work to be done.48 Next, as to the fourth point 
that the judge must act personally, one noteworthy characteristic of judicial 
functions is the fact that the work of ajudge is essentially personal to himself. 
One of the conditions which attaches to formal judicial proceedings is the 
rule that the judge shall himself personally hear and determine the matter 
to be decided. In this respect, the office of judge presents a sharp contrast 
to that of administrator. The typical administrator is a single link in a long 
chain of delegated work. His work which is to be done, and the manner of 
doing it, are in all cases ordered from above. He has no autonomy in decision-
making.49 
If, as Robson argues, the manner in which a judge is subordinated to higher 
authority and receives instructions from that authority is proper to an administrative 
function, thenjudicia1 decision-making in China is undoubtedly administrative. In China, 
judges are expected to seek instructions from higher authorities in handling important 
and difficult cases. The standard of importance or difficulty remains vague. Further-
more, judges are also expected to make decisions in a long chain consisting of many 
links, including an independent judicial officer, the collegiate bench, a chief judicial 
officer, the president, a judicial committee, and the Party committee. The final decision 
is substantially made by the president, judicial committee and the Party committee, all 
of which discuss and decide in secret. It is therefore impossible to truly identify the 
decision-maker. Because of all these factors, the manner of decision-making is indeed 
administrative rather than judicial. 
46 Inquiry Into the System of Examination and Approval of Cases by the President or the Chief Judicial 
Officer, [1982] 2 FAXUE ZAZHI at 34. 
47 W. ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 3RD ED. 42-87 (1986). 
48Id. at 43-44. 
49Id. at 67-69. 
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Appendix 
AN INSTRUCTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 
CONCERNING THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE LAW OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
A. Introduction 
This is a complete translation of the instruction issued from the Central Committee of 
the C.C.P. on Sept. 9, 1979. As discussed in the body of this article, it was not until 
this instruction was issued that the Party was prohibited from intervening in the process 
of judicial decision-making. In this sense, this instruction, although its effect was short-
lived, has great significance in the legal history of the P.R.C .. This document also 
illustrates the difficulties the P.R.C. is now facing in strengthening the socialist legal 
system. 
B. Text 
This is addressed to provincial, municipal, and autonomous regions' Party committees; 
to greater, provincial, and field military area commands; to the Party committee and to 
the Party's leading group within the central and state organ; to the general headquarters 
of the military commission and the Party committee within the armed services; and to 
the Party groups within the people's organizations. Seven important laws, including the 
criminal law and the law of criminal procedure, all passed in the Second Session of the 
Fifth National People's Congress, enjoyed the enthusiastic support of all nationalities 
within the country. Everyone is now concerned whether these laws can be put into effect 
or not. Among these important laws, the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure 
are closely related to the people's immediate interest in their everyday lives. The question 
of whether these laws can be strictly carried out or not is the touchstone for the socialist 
rule of law in our country. Therefore this is also what the broad masses of the people 
pay close attention to. The Party committee at all levels, the Party's leading cadres at all 
levels, and all members of the Party must fully recognize that this is vital because it is 
directly related to the prestige of the state and of the Party. Only by providing that the 
law be reliable, by relying on the law whenever it exists, by applying the law strictly, and 
by investigating illegalities, can it become possible to uphold the people's regular work 
and the order of production and life, and to strengthen and develop stability, unity, and 
political prospects. Only then does it become possible to develop the superiority of our 
socialist system effectively, and to strengthen the proletariat dictatorship further. Only 
then does it become possible to bring every positive factor into full play, and to pool the 
wisdom and the strength of hundreds of millions of the masses, and to carry out socialist 
modernization smoothly. 
Since the crushing of the "Gang of Four," especially the Third Plenary Session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party, we have accomplished much and created 
many conditions for strengthening the socialist democracy and legal system. However, 
there still remain such legacies of the old society as feudalism, bureaucracy, the "special 
privilege" mentality, and patriarchal behavior. Our Party has never placed an emphasis 
on establishing and strengthening the socialist legal system since the founding of the 
People's Republic of China. As a result, many cadres have been accustomed to disre-
garding the law, underestimating the legal system, substituting the Party for the govern-
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ment, replacing the law by words, and disobeying the existing laws. There are prevalent 
views among the Party cadres that law is not essential, or that the law binds the hands 
and feet [of the Party], or that policy is everything because policy is nothing but law. Since 
the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four," who practiced the ultra-
left line and frenetically destroyed democracy and the legal system, has not yet been 
liquidated, we must seriously struggle against the factionalism and the anarchism which 
were caused by them and are detrimental in many localities. If we do not make up our 
minds to resolve these problems, it will be difficult to put the laws enacted by the state 
into effect, and as a result, our Party will break its promise to the people. 
The criminal law and the law of criminal procedure passed in the Second Session 
of the Fifth National People's Congress are of vital importance for strengthening the 
socialist legal system. Accordingly, the Central Committee [of the Party] issues the fol-
lowing instructions for the purpose of the full implementation of these two laws. 
1. To handle cases strictly according to the criminal law and the law of criminal 
procedure, and resolutely correct all views and manners which contradict those 
laws: 
The task of the criminal law is to fight against all anti-revolutionary and other crimes 
by means of punishment. The task of the law of criminal procedure is to ascertain the 
criminal facts accurately and timely and to fight against the crimes actively by applying 
the law correctly. From now on, the judicial and police organs at all levels must strictly 
handle the cases according to the laws, protect the people, strike at the enemy, and 
punish criminals by utilizing legal weapons so that they may guarantee the successful 
construction of socialist modernization. 
In dealing with crimes, judicial organs at all levels must concretely analyze them 
and accurately impose the penalties according to the facts and the law. Guilt must be 
accurately distinguished from innocence in those cases. When the boundary between 
guilt and innocence remains unclear, Qudicial organs] should not rashly condemn de-
fendants as guilty. In struggling against all anti-revolutionary and other crimes which 
are harmful to society, [the judicial organs] should strictly distinguish contradictions 
between the enemy and ourselves from those among the people. [The judicial organs] 
should correct the incorrect manner in which some cadres regard all crimes as contra-
dictions between the enemy and ourselves. Regardless of socio-political status, class status, 
or political records of the accused, regardless of whether the accused committed the 
crime or not, or whether his crime belongs to the contradiction between the enemy and 
ourselves or not, all persons should be equal under the law. No organs or individuals 
except the police, the procuracy and the court should be allowed to arrest the person, 
set up an illegal court, search a house, restrict the freedom of the person, or infringe 
upon the just rights and interests of the people. Furthermore, [no organs or individuals] 
should instruct the police or the procuratorial organ to violate the legal boundary and 
procedure provided in the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure. Nor should 
they arrest the person illegally for various reasons. [No organs or individuals] should 
deviate from the rule of law and arbitrarily increase or decrease punishment. It is strictly 
forbidden for the police, the procuracy or the court to resort to any illegal means such 
as insulting a person, inflicting corporal punishment in disguised form, or forcing 
confessions by torture in treating criminals or suspects who are arrested and detained. 
The judicial personnel who mete out the punishment according to the law must decide 
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such problems as whether to deprive the convicted of political rights, whether to deprive 
the person partly or totally, or how long one can be deprived in light of the circumstances. 
Once a person has cast off the label of the landlord, rich peasant, reactionary or criminal, 
he belongs to the category of "the people." Therefore he should be guaranteed the 
democratic rights of the people. 
The violations of Party discipline, or political or other discipline should be strictly 
dealt with under the law. In as far as those violations are not concerned with the criminal 
law, [the Party organ] must avoid confusing them with criminal offenses. Among disci-
plinary actions within the Party, there is nothing more severe than expulsion from the 
Party. Since Party members are the advanced elements among the people, their political 
consciousness and behavior are usually of a higher level than those of the masses. 
Accordingly they will be good citizens, or even good working personnel in the state 
organs, even if they are expelled from the Party for various reasons. Only a few members 
of the Party who committed crimes should be punished according to criminal law. The 
Party members are able to discuss the Party line, guiding principle, and policy, or make 
suggestions according to the Party constitution. It is a normal practice of democratic life 
in the Party to supervise and criticize the ideology, the work, and the style of the Central 
Committee of the Party and the Party organizations at all levels. What should be done 
to the Party members who committed errors in their speeches and actions is not to 
retaliate, but to criticize and educate. It would be incorrect to deem them anti-Party, 
anti-Socialist, or guilty of "counter-revolutionary" crimes. This is true of the cases com-
mitted by the masses, too. The Party and the government members at all levels, regardless 
of their rank and authority, must not replace the law with words, and must not arbitrarily 
force private orders upon others. If this happens one should resist, expose, and denounce 
them. 
2. To strengthen the Party leadership over the judiciary and earnestly guarantee that 
the judicial organs exercise the functions for which the constitution and the law 
provide: 
From now on, what is most important in strengthening the Party leadership over 
the judiciary is to earnestly guarantee the implementation of laws, to make the people's 
procurate and the people's court exercise their authority independently and see that 
they are not interfered with by any administrative organs, organizations or individuals. 
It is under the Party leadership that state laws are enacted and judicial organs established. 
Accordingly, everybody cannot help respecting the law and the function of the judicial 
organ. This makes it possible to increase Party leadership and prestige. The Party 
committees and the judicial organs must each carry out their own special functions. One 
must neither replace nor become confused with the other. For this reason, the Central 
Committee of the Party decides to abolish the system of examination and approval by 
the Party committees at all levels. Every case should be tried independently according 
to the laws of the courts with jurisdiction over the cases, except for the very few cases 
committed by county-level or higher cadres or well-known personages, which would then 
require instructions from higher [courts] because of specific and important considera-
tions.The individuals concerned must firmly carry out the decisions and the rulings 
issued by the judicial organs according to the law. If [the units and individuals] disagree, 
[those units and individuals] must lodge an appeal to higher judicial organs, and those 
organs are responsible for accepting an appeal. The public security organs at all levels 
must firmly obey the Party leadership, and, at the same time, [the public security organs] 
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must strictly observe the law when they exercise functions for which the law provides. 
There is no contradiction between obeying the Party leadership and observing the law. 
The view that the two may contradict each other is absolutely erroneous, and therefore 
should be resolutely corrected. The Party leadership over the judiciary is limited to that 
of guidance and policy. The Party committee at all levels must firmly correct habits and 
manners, including those of judicial administrations, in which the Party substitutes for 
the government, or law is replaced by words, or cases are handled without regard to the 
law. What should be noticed is that such old habits and manners are being reproduced 
under the condition that the socialist legal system in our country is still imperfect. 
In the past, there were many judicial mistakes, including one in the period of Lin 
Biao and the "Gang of Four." When they were on a rampage, the socialist legal system 
was very seriously damaged. Today, since our country has already enacted a body of 
important laws including the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure, the old 
habits and manners cannot remain in force. 
The Party committee at all levels must strengthen the leadership over the judiciary, 
especially on the following points. First, by understanding and studying the situations 
of the judiciary incessantly, by leading the Party organizations within the judicial organs 
to analyze the enemy's situations, the social situations and other related situations, by 
deciding the focal point of the work, and by solving the actual difficulties we may improve 
the legal system. Second, by analyzing and supervising the implementation of Party 
guidance, policy and law by judicial organs, and by helping them to sum up experiences, 
improve their manner, add to their achievements, correct their errors and fight resolutely 
against illegal activities, we may strengthen the system for all. Third, by conscientiously 
choosing and allocating judicial cadres, by improving the quality of education of the 
Party cadres in the judicial organs, and heightening their level of ideology, policy and 
business, we can further improve the legal system. The Party organizations and cadres 
of all judicial organs must submit reports to the Party committee and must bring initiative 
and creativeness into full play. [The Party organizations and cadres] must praise judicial 
personnel who are selfless, upright and proficient in business. On the other hand, [the 
Party organization and cadres] must strictly investigate and discern cadres who illegally 
interfere and exert their influence on the works of judicial organs, or the judicial 
personnel who commit malfeasance, yield to power, practice favoritism and pervert 
justice for bribes. 
3. To strengthen judicial organizations quickly and to establish a firm contingent of 
judicial work: 
The Central Committee calls for the department of central organization, jointly with 
each judicial organ and the state organization committee, to study and work out concrete 
plans with regard to the strengthening of judicial organizations at all levels. In addition, 
they are to transfer cadres in the Party, government organizations, the armed forces and 
the department of economy who are in good ideology, behavior and health, and who 
reach a high level of policy and culture, to the judiciary after necessary training. After 
a general survey of the personnel shows who had been legally trained or had been 
engaged in legal teaching and researching. Every effort must be made to retain those 
personnel in the judiciary. 
[The department of central organization] must try to investigate and replenish the 
leading groups of judicial organs at provincial, district and county levels this year. The 
chief of the public security bureau, the president of the court and the chief procurator 
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at these three levels should be selected out of cadres who correspond to the members 
of the Party standing committee at the same level. Nothing is more important than the 
strengthening of the organizations of the court and the procuracy. It is necessary to 
reorganize a contingent of judicial cadres in office, as well as to adjust and replenish a 
leading body of judicial organs at all levels. 
The office for the administration of justice established by the State Council shall be 
coordinately responsible for training the judicial cadres, as well as for judicial adminis-
tration. The department of public security takes charge of the task of training capable 
policemen and professional personnel. Institutes or schools of political science, law and 
public security which were once abolished should be reestablished as quickly as possible. 
If possible, it is desirable to set up a department of law or a vocational school of law in 
colleges specializing in liberal arts. If necessary, every province, city and autonomous 
region may establish various kinds of institutes of political science and law, and bring 
professional personnel up through the various training courses as well as training in 
rotation the judicial and the public security cadres who are already in office. In order 
to maintain the stability of key members of the public security and the judicial organs 
at the county level or higher, it is necessary to restore the system that requires the higher 
authorities of those organs to supervise and check on the cadres concerned, in cooper-
ation with the regional Party committees. The regional Party committees must ask for 
the approval of higher organs with regard to the allocation of leading cadres among the 
Party members in the public security, the procuratorial, and the judicial organs. 
4. To make propaganda for the law widespread and profound and to prepare for full 
implementation of the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure: 
It is necessary to create legal propaganda and intensify the legal education of vast 
numbers of Party members, cadres and the masses through the media. Every university, 
middle school and primary school must practice legal education. The Party school and 
the cadre school at each level must put legal education on the curriculum. All the working 
personnel in the public security, the procuratorial, and the judicial organs at all levels, 
including the people's police and the working personnel in the prisons and labor reform 
camps, must willingly study the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure. The 
emphasis of education for the masses should be placed on the criminal law and the law 
of criminal procedure, so that every household may fully understand the contents of 
these laws. It is necessary to make everybody aware of such questions as what these laws 
protect, what they are opposed to, how the observance of law can be distinguished from 
a violation of law, and how to heighten the level of consciousness of the law. 
The Party organizations and the judicial organs at all levels must incessantly imple-
ment the spirit of the Party's Third Plenary Session, earnestly fulfill the Party's policy, 
and firmly grasp the work of sorting out long-pending cases and of correcting wrong, 
false, and misjudged cases. [The Party organizations and the judicial organs] must correct 
any custom which conflicts with the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure. 
[The Party organization and the judicial organs] must revise any rules and regula-
tions which are contrary to the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure. Any 
criminals in custody who are neither prosecuted nor tried yet should be prosecuted or 
tried as quickly as possible according to the law of criminal procedure. If there are cases 
in which the evidence of a crime is not sufficient to prosecute, those cases should be 
properly dealt with according to the law. In short, [the Party organizations and the 
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judicial organs] must earnestly prepare for the official enforcement of the criminal law 
and the law of criminal procedure on January 1, 1980. 
5. The Party organizations at all levels, leading cadres and all Party members must 
exercise leadership in observing the law: 
Since the laws in our country were enacted by the highest organ of the state power 
on the basis of the Party leadership and widespread democracy, it is natural that they 
represent the will and interest of the people of the country. They embody the policy 
and proposition of the Party and therefore must be highly respected. Accordingly, from 
the Party Central Committee on down to organizations on the most basic level, and from 
the Chairman of the C.C.P. to the individual Party member, all of them should, without 
exception, conform to the law. [The Party organizations and leading cadres] must adhere 
to the principle that all people are equal before the law, and that there cannot be any 
exceptions. No one may place himself over the law. All Party members, especially its 
leading cadres at all levels, must study, understand and exercise leadership in observing 
the law. 
Most cadres in our Party are good or relatively good. However, there still exist a 
small number of cadres, especially leading cadres and their relatives, who adhere to the 
"special privilege" mentality, that eagerly seek personal privilege, and disregard Party 
discipline and the law. They engage in malpractice for selfish ends by resorting to the 
authority of their offices, suppressing democracy, and retaliating against others. They 
also bring the decadent ways of old style officialdom and the bad habits of government 
office in feudal China into the Party and state organs, seriously contaminating the body 
of the Party, damaging the relationship between the Party and the masses, and destroying 
the dignity of the socialist legal system in our country. The Party Central Committee 
deems it necessary to sound the alarm to all comrades of the Party, and to check resolutely 
all of the unhealthy tendencies mentioned above. Disciplinary sanctions should be taken 
against those persons who do not heed repeated admonitions, and who seriously violate 
the law and discipline, no matter how high their positions are, or how great their 
contributions in the past were. Criminals who violate the criminal law should be dealt 
with according to the law, and those violations should never be covered up or ignored. 
Implementation of the law is in keeping with that of the Party line, guidance and 
policy. From now on, any resolutions or instructions issued from the Party organizations 
at all levels must not go against the law, but be advantageous to the implementation of 
the law. If the content of a law does not fit the needs of the circumstances any longer, 
the law should be revised only according to established legal procedure. 
Once Party committees have received this instruction, they must at all levels combine 
it with practice, discuss it and conscientiously carry it out. If [you, the Party committees] 
find some important circumstance or problem in implementing it, we hope that [you, 
the Party committees] will immediately report the problem to us, the Central Committee 
of the Party. 
The Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party 
September 9, 1979 
